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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the center of the ideal model of the republic sits the jury.  It 
expresses an idea of self-governance and an ideal of social justice—an 
educated populace making law.  With its republican roots, it is no 
wonder that the jury is entrenched as part of the American constitutional 
order.1  Yet, in tort law—the most social norm oriented, and hence jury 
dominated, area of law—two spectacular collapses in the faith of the 
jury have occurred.  The United States Supreme Court has restrained, in 
two areas, the jury with constitutional shackles.  In the 1960s, the state 
courts of Alabama showed a potential to undermine free speech integral 
 
 *  Washington and Lee University, School of Law.  The Author thanks Shawn 
Bone, Class of 2005, for valuable research assistance on this Article. 
 1. The most recent articulation of the jury under the U.S. Constitution is Blakely 
v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536, 2538 (2004) (affirming the Sixth Amendment as 
reserving jury power). 
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to the progress of the civil rights movement.  Thus was launched the 
long and uncompleted journey begun in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.2 
In the last couple of decades, the Supreme Court has detected a 
distemper that threatened federal principles and national economic 
interests.  The potential of juries in isolated communities to levy heavy 
punitive damages against large out-of-state corporations—to send a 
message—was threatening to economic interests and federal coordination.3  
This proposition prompted a judicial conclusion that the civil fine could, 
by its arbitrary excessiveness, breach the due process arm of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.4  It is easy to see how this foray of federal 
authority was prompted, just as it was in Sullivan.  The problem now, as 
after Sullivan, is to create a comprehensive stable body of law to work 
alongside state law.  This body of law, though, has failed to materialize.  
The guideposts articulated in Gore5 and Campbell6 are fragile reeds set 
upon a blasted foggy moor with treacherous patches of quicksand.  The 
Supreme Court, adept in the high reaches of constitutional law, lacks a 
common law sense.  Thus, one finds the Court’s bizarre adventures relating 
to the defense of comment in defamation7 and in guiding judicial 
decisionmaking in awarding punitive damages in concert with the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In the latter, one finds the unenlightening 
references to reprehensibility, ratios, and comparative sanctions8 that 
have been variously interpreted by the courts, necessitating the Supreme 
Court to refashion its preferred guidelines.9   
The Supreme Court’s adventures invite a horde of new commentators 
to parse the Court’s opinions.  These are often enlightening.10  Thus, we 
have a burgeoning jurisprudence of punitives and an anxious blend of 
state and federal law.11  All this is occurring in the United States, while 
 
 2. 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964). 
 3. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996). 
 4. Id. at 568. 
 5. Id. at 574–85. 
 6. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418–29 (2003). 
 7. See generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (refusing to 
establish constitutional protection for statements of opinion in defamation law leaving 
earlier law in great uncertainty). 
 8. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–85. 
 9. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418–29. 
 10. See Colleen P. Murphy, Comparison to Criminal Sanctions in the 
Constitutional Review of Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1443 (2004); Steven 
L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Road for Evaluating Punitive Damages: 
Lifting the Haze from the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 441 
(2004). 
 11. Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Company, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 
1164 (2003) (rejecting any formula flowing from a ratio of compensatory to punitive 
damages), review granted, 86 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2004); accord Williams v. Kaufman 
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punitive damages are receiving close examination in the rest of the 
common law world.  In England, they have arisen from a judicial grave.12  
In Canada and Australia, they are subject to lively debate.13  In New 
Zealand—the land of no liability in tort for personal injuries—punitives 
survive.14  It would be salutary if these separate developments could be 
heeded by the courts now wrestling with the law.  The law has common 
roots that would form most useful comparative analysis if rediscovered.15 
The aim of this Article is to focus the punitive damages debate on a 
strong theoretical basis.  A republican theory firmly establishes the place 
of the punitive damages award by juries in civil suits.16  The present 
struggles by the Supreme Court to engender more predictability are 
appropriate, but should not lead to the destruction of the role of the 
jury.17  Judicial reforms should be directed at the strengthening of the 
 
County, 352 F.3d 994, 1016 (5th Cir. 2003).  On reprehensibility, the courts have found 
that racial and ethnic employment discrimination justifies significant punitive damages, 
dominating the other Campbell criteria.  See Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 
1020, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1602 (2004); Bogle v. McClure, 
332 F.3d 1347, 1362 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. dismissed, 124 S. Ct. 1168 (2004).  But see 
Daka, Inc. v. McCrae, 839 A.2d 682, 700 (D.C. 2003) (applying Campbell and finding 
that the punitive damages exceeded the ratio and relationship with other state or 
legislative sanctions). 
 12. See Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2002] 2 A.C. 
122, 145 (H.L. 2001); Andrew Tettenborn, Punitive Damages—A View From England, 
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1551 (2004). 
 13. See, e.g., Harris v. Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd. (2003) 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298.  Punitive 
or exemplary damages in other common law systems have been closely examined in 
recent jurisprudence and often extended beyond the usual context of tort.  Some courts 
extol the remedy to contract claims, and others to breach of fiduciary obligations.  See 
David Morgan, Harris v. Digital Pulse: The Availability of Exemplary Damages in 
Equity, 29 MONASH U. L. REV. 377, 382–84 (2003). 
 14. See, e.g., Wilding v. Attorney-General [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 787, §§ 16–18 
(noting the availability of exemplary damages under New Zealand law). 
 15. The papers in this symposium may be useful in educating Anglo-American 
courts of the ongoing punitive damage debates and permitting a more informed and 
principled body of law to emerge.  See, e.g., Gary Davis & Michael Tilbury, The Law of 
Remedies in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century: An Australian Perspective, 41 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1711 (2004); see also John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A 
Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 391 (2004) (examining the 
availability of punitive damages in Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, and the 
United States).  For an example of scholarship that provides enlightening comparative 
analysis in tort law, see Jane Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from 
Case-Law-Focused “Middle Theory”, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 531 (2002) (comparing 
common law approaches outside the United States to recovery of pure economic loss). 
 16. See infra notes 77–111 and accompanying text (analyzing the value of the 
republican theory to punitive damages). 
 17. See infra notes 126–54 and accompanying text (contending that there is a 
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jury to bring it into close conformity with its republican rationale as an 
institution that maximizes the freedom of citizens from domination.18 
II.  CRIMINAL ROOTS 
As I wrote several years ago, “punitive damages in the law predate[] 
verbal identification.”19  Before the writ of trespass, an aggrieved person 
would utter “words of felony” enabling recovery of the bot, a tariff in 
accord with the crime and extracted from the goods of the malefactor.20  
In assuaging loss, effective law was brought to the land in the form of 
the writ of trespass.21  The modern separation of punishment and trespass 
had no place at that time.22  Damages were designed to keep the peace.23  
Honor ran deep.24  As Pollock and Maitland reported, “before an English 
local court of the thirteenth century the plaintiff will claim compensation, 
not only for the damage (damnum) but also for the shame (huntage, 
hontage, dedecus, pudor, vituperium) that has been done him.”25  The 
King’s Court regarded this element in awarding damages.26  The purpose 
of discouraging the dangerous practice of dueling is apparent in the 
willingness of the courts in the eighteenth century to award damages 
pitched to punctured honor.27  The Australian High Court has recognized 
this purpose as a basis for exemplary damages.28  It is not a feature, 
however, that has resonated in other modern courts as a reason for the 
award of punitive damages.29 
One of the familiar divides in the law is the separation of crime from 
 
social value in allowing juries to award punitive damages). 
 18. See infra notes 155–68 and accompanying text (outlining the direction judicial 
reform should take concerning punitive damages). 
 19. David F. Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot Zones, 56 LA. L. REV. 781, 
784 (1996). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 785. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 537 (2d ed. reissue 1968). 
 26. Partlett, supra note 19, at 785. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Lamb v. Cotogno (1987) 164 C.L.R. 1, 9 (Austl.) (“[T]hey serve to assuage 
any urge for revenge felt by victims and to discourage any temptation to engage in self-
help likely to endanger the peace.”). 
 29. For the criminal and civil law divide see Harris v. Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd. 
(2003) 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298, 386–91 (Heydon, J.A.) (discussing the criminal and civil law 
intertwining and holding that equitable breaches could not support punitive damages), 
and Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 A.C. 122, 141.  
See also Gotanda, supra note 15, at 402 (discussing the recognized bases for punitive 
damages in England, with no consideration of the honor that has been impugned by the 
defendant). 
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tort, of punishment by the state, and of private actions for compensation.30  
The state was a safer prosecutor in the usual event.31  Manifold protections 
have been erected to guard against error—protections entrenched in the 
United States under the Sixth Amendment.32  Punitive damages with 
their criminal law aspect lingered in the background of civil law, though, 
and, with the felt feebleness of state enforcement in the modern day, the 
private suit of civil vindication has been revivified.33 
The state is a notoriously poor enforcer of petty crimes.  The police 
force does not have the resources to bring all malefactors to book, nor 
would the court enforce such a duty if it existed.34  Moreover, overzealous 
policing and prosecution carries real social costs.35  Judge Richard Posner 
examined the utility of private fines in the recent bedbug case—Mathias 
v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.36  In Mathias, the court upheld a 
punitive damages award against the defendant hotel, which had rented 
out rooms knowing they were ridden with bedbugs.37  (Bedbugs, as the 
learned judge notes, are making a comeback in America.38)  Giving the 
example of a person spitting in another’s face, Judge Posner rightly said 
that this action would not be addressed through the machinery of state 
criminal enforcement.39  Compensatory damages would not be sufficient.40  
They would not reflect the plaintiff’s hurt dignity, and would not provide 
an incentive to sue.  Moreover, an incentive to sue touches a third 
reason—punitives provide a peaceful way to gain satisfaction rather than 
personal retaliation via breaching the peace.41  The roots of punitive 
 
 30. See Partlett, supra note 19, at 785–87 (describing the historical division 
between tort law and criminal law, especially in the area of punitive damages). 
 31. Id. at 785. 
 32. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV 139, 149 (1986). 
 33. See other supercompensatory remedies, reflecting the criminal aspect of the 
remedy the U.S. Supreme Court calls the proof of the basis of punitive damages 
according to “clear and convincing” evidence.  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 
U.S. 1, 58 (1991). 
 34. Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860–61 (N.Y. 1968). 
 35. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, TO PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE 
SAFETY (1985). 
 36. 347 F.3d 672, 675–78 (7th Cir. 2003); cf. Allan Beever, The Structure of 
Aggravated and Exemplary Damages, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 95–96 (2003) 
(discussing the core purpose of punitive and exemplary damages). 
 37. Mathias, 347 F.3d at 678. 
 38. Id. at 673. 
 39. Id. at 676. 
 40. Id. at 676–77. 
 41. Id.; see also Lamb v. Cotogno (1987) 164 C.L.R. 1, 9 (Austl.) (“It is an aspect 
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damages are deep.  Justice Windeyer of the Australian High Court, a 
distinguished legal historian, had it right in Uren v. John Fairfax: 
Compensation is the dominant remedy if not the purpose of the law of torts 
today.  But fault still has a place in many forms of wrongdoing.  And the roots 
of tort and crime in the law of England are greatly intermingled.  Some things 
that today are seen as anomalies have roots that go deep, too deep for them to be 
easily uprooted.42 
Lord Devlin, as Andrew Tettenborn has nicely articulated,43 could not 
live with this messiness.44  In Rookes, the House of Lords cabined punitive 
damages to a remote corner of the law, basically emasculating the 
remedy.45  However, Rookes has been savaged badly.  It is seen as an 
unhappy experiment.  The English courts are loath to engage in tort 
reform, and it was a misfortune that the House of Lords chose its moment of 
law reform so badly.  Even in an era in which the Commonwealth courts 
still showed deference to the House of Lords, the decision was widely 
repudiated.46  Punitive damages may be returning elsewhere in the 
common law world, but the legal hothouse still remains in the United 
States, where a body of tort doctrine invites strong remedies.47  
Moreover, punitive damages are replete with the language of rights.48  
The damages are given for the arrogant abrogation of a plaintiff’s 
rights.49  The law sets its face against the economists who theorize that 
liability was merely a means of efficiently allocating resources, and the 
compensationists who criticize the moral—fault-based—heart of tort 
law.50 
However, modern scholarship has often gleaned an economic and 
 
of exemplary damages that they serve to assuage any urge for revenge felt by victims 
and to discourage any temptation to engage in self-help likely to endanger the peace.”); 
XL Petroleum (N.S.W.) Proprietary Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Austl.) Proprietary Ltd. (1985) 
155 C.L.R. 448, 471 (Austl.) (“As an award of exemplary damages is intended to punish 
the defendant for conduct showing a conscious and contumelious disregard for the 
plaintiff’s rights and to deter him from committing like conduct again . . . .”); Donselaar 
v. Donselaar [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 97, 106–07 (noting the role of punitive damages in 
preventing breaches of the peace in response to personal harms). 
 42. Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118, 149–50 (Austl.), 
approved in Gray v. Motor Accident Comm’n (1998) 196 C.L.R. 1, 1, 16 (Austl.). 
 43. Tettenborn, supra note 12, at 1553. 
 44. See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1160–61 (H.L.) (examining and 
circumscribing the proper role for exemplary damages in English law). 
 45. Id. at 1159–60, 1163–64. 
 46. Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1040–41, 1046–48, 1067 (H.L.). 
 47. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and 
Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1404–07 (1993) (noting the vengeance aspects 
of tort law). 
 48. Partlett, supra note 19, at 791. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See generally PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY (2002). 
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compensationist rationale.51  The deterrence model is well explored and 
still finds academic favor in the United States.  For example, Cass 
Sunstein and others, in an important study, insist that the thrust of 
punitive damages is to optimally deter harm-providing behavior.52  The 
compensationist model in the American setting is being newly and 
effectively analyzed by Professor Catherine Sharkey.53  Her argument is 
that punitive damages reflect a concern to compensate third party and 
social harms not internalized in compensating the plaintiff.54  Aggravated 
damages, as a form of compensation for loss of dignity, are at last being 
recognized in American jurisprudence.55  They have been acknowledged 
elsewhere, but not always with clarity.56  We can capture an old wisdom 
in the law in recognizing honor as a central value to be protected by the 
law of torts.57 
To the extent that the Supreme Court has commenced its analysis with 
the excessiveness and arbitrariness of punitive damages under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the basic rationale of punitive damages is 
implicated.58  One would imagine constitutional control should aid in 
bringing punitive damages back to their appropriate functions.59 
 
 51. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Juries Decide?, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 381, 400 (2003) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW 
JURIES DECIDE (2002) [hereinafter PUNITIVE DAMAGES]) (arguing in favor of a social 
compensationist model of punitive damages) [hereinafter Sharkey, Should Juries Decide?]. 
 52. See generally PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 51. 
 53. See Sharkey, Should Juries Decide?, supra note 51, at 400–01 (noting her 
theory of social compensation); see generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages 
as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003) [hereinafter Sharkey, Societal Damages]. 
 54. Sharkey, Should Juries Decide?, supra note 51, at 400–01; see also Michael B. 
Kelly, Do Punitive Damages Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1429, 1437  
(2004). 
 55. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 91 (2003) (discussing the role, purpose, and effect of 
aggravated damages). 
 56. See Jeff Berryman, Equitable Compensation for Breach by Fact-Based 
Fiduciaries: Tentative Thoughts on Clarifying Remedial Goals, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 95, 
111–13 (1999) (noting the possibility of using aggravated damages where there is a 
breach of fiduciary duty); Beever, supra note 36, at 88–94 (examining the role of 
aggravated damages in English law). 
 57. See Partlett, supra note 19, at 784–85 (describing the centrality of the concept 
of honor in traditional common law tort actions). 
 58. Id. at 791.  This commentary, though, is not meant to challenge the common 
law controls a court has over punitive damages.  Id. at 790 (noting the traditional 
restrictions a court can use to limit or reject an award of punitive damages). 
 59. But see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that it is the legislative function to intervene). 
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III.  DETERRENCE AND RETRIBUTION 
In an earlier paper, I suggested that deterrence and retribution both 
had severe shortcomings.60  The former has attracted the majority of 
fans, probably because it fits well within the economic analysis of the 
function of damages.61  Supercompensatory damages encourage an attorney, 
as a bounty hunter, to root out harm-producing behavior, bringing 
malefactors to book.62  The models are elegant, but most imperfect, as 
transaction costs plague an efficient allocation of resources.63  None of 
this is fatal for economic analysis, but the persistence of punitive 
damages does not depend upon Coase as much as it does upon viewing 
tort law as playing an essential role in inculcating responsibility and 
promoting social cohesion.64 
There is a long philosophical discourse on retribution and punishment.65  
It is certainly possible to say that much of the discourse supports both 
publicly and privately initiated punishment.66  The most satisfactory 
explanation stems from the idea of punishment as reprobation and 
denunciation of a wrongful act.67  Although punishment may be a good 
in itself, it is the efficacious social consequences of punishment that 
ground a satisfactory model of punishment, and, therefore, punitive 
damages.68  Punitive damages awards serve society in demonstrating 
correct values and the law’s commitment to defending an individual’s 
autonomy.69  To levy punitive damages is to educate and commit in the 
coin of commerce.70  Punitive damages carry a great advantage over state 
 
 60. Partlett, supra note 19, at 797–806. 
 61. Id. at 795–96; see also Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: 
When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1146 (1988) (explaining the legal 
academia’s consensus that deterrence is the key role for punitive damages). 
 62. Partlett, supra note 19, at 798. 
 63. For example, the agency costs are currently growing due to disparate 
incentives faced by attorneys and clients.  See Ellen Wright Clayton & David F. Partlett, 
Lawyer-Client Relationships, in FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE 72, 77–78 (1993). 
 64. Partlett, supra note 19, at 799; see generally David G. Owen, The Moral 
Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 427 (1993). 
 65. See, e.g., Partlett, supra note 19, at 800–06 (describing the retribution principle). 
 66. Id. at 802–06. 
 67. Id. at 803–04. 
 68. Id. at 805. 
 69. Id.; see also Ronald J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further 
Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 331–37 
(1990) (discussing denunciation theory). 
 70. See C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 45 (1987); cf. Andrew Burrows, 
Reforming Exemplary Damages: Expansion or Abolition?, in WRONGS AND REMEDIES IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 153, 160 (Peter Birks ed., 1996) (asking why damages 
should be the sole form of punishment). 
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sanctions, since damages can be calibrated to reflect the heinousness of the 
wrongful act.71  What is lost in notice is gained in sensitivity.  The line is 
unclear, and the Supreme Court’s attempt in Gore to provide better notice 
militates against calibration according to heinousness, or, as the Court 
would term it, reprehensibility.72  Campbell,73 however, diminishes the 
weight of mechanical guideposts—the ratio of punitive to compensatory,74 
the influence of statutory sanctions, and the multiplication of breaches as a 
guide to reprehensibility.75  Rather, the one guidepost, sitting as a 
stronger reed than the others on our blasted moor, is reprehensibility.76  
It is the factor that after Campbell has some life to it. 
IV.  THE REPUBLICAN IDEAL77 
I have suggested that the goal to be sought in tort law, as in criminal 
law, is to entrench within the sphere of law a republican ideal in which 
the citizen enjoys “full dominion.”78  The law provides freedom in terms 
of “full dominion” when it enables the enjoyment of liberty equal to that 
of other citizens, when this freedom is notorious, and when the prospect 
of liberty is maximally compatible with the prospect for all citizens.79  
The law should be uncontroversial, stable, and satiable.80  The rule on 
punitive damages uncontroversially punishes consciously wrongful behavior, 
thus protecting liberty and dominion.  Additionally, it promotes stability 
by avoiding an overreaching by the state, and it is satiable in that it 
protects dominion by the least intrusive strategy.81 
The laws in a republic value freedom in the sense that no citizen is 
 
 71. Partlett, supra note 19, at 811. 
 72. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–80 (1996). 
 73. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 74. See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(insisting that Campbell provides no presumptive ratio upon which to base a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment).  But cf. Chanenson & Gotanda, supra note 10, at 463–64 
(indicating that the Supreme Court did provide certain target ratios beyond which there is 
a presumptive violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 75. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419–24, 428. 
 76. Id. at 419–24. 
 77. For full explication, see generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT 
JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990). 
 78. See Partlett, supra note 19, at 806–16 (advocating a “full dominion” as the 
consequential value to understanding tort law). 
 79. Id. at 808. 
 80. Id. at 809. 
 81. Id. at 809–10. 
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dominated by the state apparatus or by fellow citizens.82  It is a freedom 
enjoyed in a society.83  A person is dominated when subject to arbitrary 
interference.84  It is worth noting that the republican ideal is distinguishable 
from the liberal ideal of freedom.  The former—the republican—contemplates 
that interference may occur at the hands of the state, provided it is 
nonarbitrary.  The latter sets its face against state interference.85  Yet the 
liberal ideal of noninterference allows domination, provided it does not 
amount to interference.86  The nondomination form of freedom and its 
noninterference version have waxed and waned in the history of ideas.87 
A nation of laws is necessary, although not sufficient, to provide 
nondomination.88  Without laws, oppression will reign, but, as Grant 
Gilmore has reminded us, in hell every act would be governed by laws.89  
Law alone is not sufficient, though, because the laws themselves may 
be tyrannous.90  But where laws establish mechanisms, situate institutions, 
and instantiate principles to promote freedom from domination, they 
are at the base of a republican freedom.91  The rule of law is particularly 
important because it establishes a nonarbitrary basis, which governs 
citizens.92  It gives citizens the right to make choices that are not 
arbitrarily dominated by others, choices for which, because of freedom 
assumptions, the actor will be held responsible.93  The law necessarily 
interferes, but does so with a republican ideal of restrained coercion—only 
in the interest of preserving the citizens’ common interests in a manner 
that “conforms to the opinions received among the citizenry.”94 
Often, punitive damages are seen as illegitimate because they 
substitute for the criminal law.95  It is said that the criminal law with its 
 
 82. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 66–
67 (1997). 
 83. Id. at 66. 
 84. Id. at 52. 
 85. Id. at 66–67. 
 86. Id. at 8–10. 
 87. Id at 1–12. 
 88. See Partlett, supra note 19, at 807 (“For the liberal, being left alone is freedom; 
for the republican, freedom is a condition of citizenship to claim equality before the law.  
Within a community a person may participate in the process of self-rule.  Freedom is 
inseparable from law.  Citizenship is woven in the law.”). 
 89. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Partlett, supra note 19, at 806–10 (examining the role of laws in a 
republican model of government). 
 92. Id. at 808. 
 93. PHILIP PETTIT, A THEORY OF FREEDOM: FROM THE PSYCHOLOGY TO THE 
POLITICS OF AGENCY 13 (2001). 
 94. PETTIT, supra note 82, at 36–37. 
 95. See, e.g., James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic 
That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1158–64 (1984) (arguing that 
punitive damages illegitimately serve as a substitute for the criminal law). 
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protections—both common law and constitutional—would more effectively 
guard the individual.96  A republican ideal, however, keeps criminal law 
gated; it should have a limited scope; it should be parsimonious.97 
The reason is apparent by reference to criminal law enforcement.  In 
the modern state, the criminal law is enforced by police and other public 
officials who, if given ambit, will be faced with temptation to abuse 
power.98  Any controls must be imperfect.99  Who will guard the 
guardians?100  Freedom from domination is lost in a society where public 
officials manipulate their position and use their powers to oppress 
citizenry.101  The republican sentencing requires adherence to the “three 
R’s.”102  The offender should recognize the victim as a free nondominated 
agent, it should recompense the victim by granting restitution, compensation, 
or reparation from the offender for abuses of power, and it should 
reassure “the victim and the community at large that the offender will 
not continue to be a threat . . . .”103 
A republic would be corrupted if all regulation were to be turned over 
to criminal enforcement.104  There must be a large reserve where 
criminal law should have no writ, and, in those areas where the writ 
runs, careful controls must be applied to officials charged with the public 
task.105 
Punitive damages should have a central place.  With private decentralized 
enforcement, the vice of official overreaching is avoided.106  The form of 
action in tort complies, moreover, with the “three R’s” of republican 
sentencing.107  The power of the victim to bring a cause of action 
 
 96. Id. at 1159 & n.189. 
 97. BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 77, at 202–04. 
 98. See PETTIT, supra note 82, at 155. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See generally THEODORE CAPLOW, PERVERSE INCENTIVES: THE NEGLECT OF 
SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1994) (thoroughly examining the incentive 
pitfalls relating to public officials and authorities). 
 101. See PETTIT, supra note 82, at 155–56. 
 102. Id. at 156. 
 103. Id. at 156–57. 
 104. BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 77, at 203. 
 105. See Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual 
Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1785–87 (1994) 
(arguing in favor of a citizen trust model of criminal law as represented by the Fourth 
Amendment); see also PETTIT, supra note 82, at 154–55 (advocating a limited role for 
criminal law in the republican state). 
 106. Partlett, supra note 19, at 810–11. 
 107. PETTIT, supra note 82, at 156–57. 
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recognizes his power as a free, nondominated actor.  Punitive damages 
are launched against the offender, and the victim receives compensation, 
restitution, or reparation.  The nexus of payment from offender to victim 
undergirds a corrective justice notion that itself serves to establish 
nondomination of one citizen over another. 
An award designed to be overly public provides the last R— reassurance.  
A court gives the award after careful deliberation and by reference to 
legal principles in which the matter is given its day in court.  The penalty 
is designed to deter the offender from future similar behavior.108 
It is important to recognize the central place of punitive damages.  
Outrageous behavior invading the rights of fellow citizens is anathema 
to the republican ideal, and is ideally punished and deterred by this tort 
remedy.109  The search is to ensure that the remedy does not stray from 
the “three R’s” in its application.  It should not become a weapon of 
oppression and domination.110  If the application of punitive damages 
were to become arbitrary, republican ideals would be flouted.111  Thus 
the need and the anxious search for principles. 
V.  CONFORMITY WITH THE REPUBLICAN IDEAL 
The fact that the putative offender should be given notice is of 
particular concern.  Certainly, the requirement that the behavior flout 
clearly recognized norms and be carried out in contumelious disregard 
for the victims’ rights, meets the need of notoriety.  However, the 
possibility of arbitrariness continues to lurk in the wide discretions given 
to juries in determining the quantum of punitives.112  It is, therefore, 
predictable and appropriate that the Supreme Court has attempted to 
constrain the discretion by principled rules of law and judicial review.  It 
has done so in due process terms—the very essence of the rule of law.  
Jury instructions, the judges’ power of remitter,113 the enhanced powers 
of appeal courts to review the jury awards,114 the burden of proof on 
clear and convincing evidence,115 and the guidelines for appellate 
 
 108. See Weinrib, supra note 55, at 84–88 (explaining the corrective justice 
function of punitive damages). 
 109. See Partlett, supra note 19, at 811 (concluding that tort law, and more 
specifically punitive damages, is best suited to meet the republican ideal of the protection 
of personal honor). 
 110. Cf. PETTIT, supra note 82, at 154 (discussing the potential for misuse of the 
republican model of sentencing). 
 111. Cf. id. at 157. 
 112. See, e.g., Partlett, supra note 19, at 815–16.  See generally PUNITIVE DAMAGES, 
supra note 51. 
 113. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567, 583 (1996). 
 114. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 115. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 111 (Mo. 1996). 
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courts116 are designed to reduce the capacity of the punitive jury awards 
to breach the basic republican ideal of nondomination.  Professor Cass 
Sunstein and others rightly choose the same ground for their analysis.117  
They argue the essential arbitrariness of the jury in determining awards 
of punitive damages.118  The critique, however, is radically incomplete.  
For the essential issue is that if these norms were not enforced via the 
law of torts, they should fall to the arms of the state and its officials.119  
Two evils may follow: either a failure to enforce obvious and egregious 
breaches of rights, or the erection of a greater enforcement apparatus 
with its attendant tendencies to overreach and oppress.120 
Much can be said in favor of a republican theory, especially in a 
nation based upon republican ideals.  Formative institutions encourage 
deliberation between citizens, state officials, and the state itself.121  The 
stronger those institutions, the more a citizen’s dominion is enhanced.122  
As stated earlier, central to our analysis, and the very republican ideal, is 
the jury.123  In this ideal, the community is brought into the administration 
of justice.124  Service on a jury is a civil obligation, which democratizes 
the deliberations of the courts.125  In this sense, if the law operates with 
 
 116. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003). 
 117. See generally PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 51. 
 118. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries 
Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 34–35 (2004). 
 119. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 120. See supra notes 95–105 and accompanying text (noting the inability of the 
criminal law to effectively enforce minor personal crimes, or, in the alternative, the 
oppression that would result from such enforcement). 
 121. See BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 77, at 82; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE 
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 42–43 (1993).  The role of 
formative institutions in inculcating civic virtue is fully developed in MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
317–51 (1996). 
 122. Partlett, supra note 19, at 810. 
 123. See infra notes 124–54 and accompanying text (positing the role of the jury in 
the republican theory). 
 124. Partlett, supra note 19, at 810. 
 125. Maybe this is inefficient, but, as Amar points out, efficiency has very little to 
do with the constitutional value being expressed here.  See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1175 (1995); 
cf. George L. Priest, Introduction: The Problem and Efforts to Understand It, in 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 51, at 1, 1–4 (critiquing the jury for its arbitrariness and 
lack of rationality).  But see Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently?, 
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 284–88 (2003) (reviewing PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 
51) (criticizing the focus on deterrence to the exclusion of retribution in PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES, supra note 52). 
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healthy institutions, mediating between the state and the individual, 
common law relating to punitive damages has a justifiably firm place. 
VI.  THE JURY AND THE REPUBLICAN IDEAL 
Discourse on tort theory has not featured the republican ideal.  Tort 
lawyers are accustomed to economic analysis, corrective justice, 
compensatory justice, and ideas of responsibility and morality.126  None 
of these notions clearly support the structure of punitive damages.127  
However, the structure of privately enforced fines for arrogant and 
intentional harm of a citizen’s rights is consonant with the proportionally 
and parsimonious rule of punishment.128  The community’s condemnation 
of such behavior through the jury reinforces this rule. 
Now the real rub is whether this is a heroic, unrealistic view of 
modern American society.  I could settle for a theory that would be 
based on the internal view of the law and not concern itself with 
consistency to external indicia.  But I do want to ground a theory on its 
real world impact.  My argument conforms with Francis Fukuyama’s 
optimistic view of the capacity of society to reconstitute itself.129  
Citizens’ involvement in the ordering of a society is vital to a healthy 
social order.130  The jury is one such institution.  The distemper, about 
which I wrote earlier, comes from a breakdown in the citizens’ role.131  
Citizens avoid service on juries.  They are too often badly treated once 
 
 126. Partlett, supra note 19, at 792–802; see also Stapleton, supra note 15, at 534–
35 (eschewing general, all-encompassing theories of tort law for a blend of pragmatic 
theory and common law articulation). 
 127. See the corrective justice discussion of punitive damages by Weinrib, supra 
note 55, at 86 (arguing that punitive damages do not comport with corrective justice, 
because they do not measure “anything that the plaintiff has been wrongfully deprived of”). 
 128. Partlett, supra note 19, at 809–10. 
 129. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE 
AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999) (arguing that despite social 
alienation, social institutions are available to reform social cohesion). 
 130. There is a large literature on the role of mediating institutions in society.  For a 
sampling, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213 (1994); Stephen Macedo, The 
Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social Capital as Substantive Morality, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1573 (2001); Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. 
REV. 639 (2002); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 
(1988); Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of 
Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2004), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=499285. 
 131. See infra notes 132–43 and accompanying text (noting the breakdown of the 
jury in the judicial system).  But see generally David Millon, Juries, Judges, and 
Democracy, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 135 (1993) (reviewing SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN 
MARSHALL (1990)) (indicting the presumption that the jury is a failing institution and 
conceptualizing a populist purpose for the jury). 
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they serve.  Education on this fundamental civic duty is lacking.  Too 
often the institution is seen as the one to be manipulated, and as a relic 
that ought to be dispensed with in a modern legal system.132 
Legal writers do not typically identify the jury as a mediating 
institution.  The focus is usually placed upon voluntary associations 
because they promote a civil society, empower the citizens in the face of 
overweening government, provide identity to individuals, enhance the 
individual’s voice, allow more effective pursuit of common objectives, 
and build a socially situated individual autonomy that finds comfort 
from the cold blasts of atomized society.133 
Modern society, seeking to shore up social capital, often views the 
voluntary association one-dimensionally as a good.134  Freedom to form 
voluntary associations outside governmental interference, however, is 
not an unalloyed good.  The room left for voluntary associations spawns 
the growth also of undemocratic organizations—at the extreme, mafia 
and terrorist groupings.135 
The jury is much more a creation of our constitutional and legal 
history.  Its origins were in communities’ interest in peaceful coexistence.136  
It is an institution much celebrated as a guardian of freedom.  Unlike 
voluntary associations, citizens do not band together to promote long-
term interests.  Rather, the power of the jury acts to constrain overreaching 
government.  Its shifting and impermanent composition restricts the 
ability of powerful factions and government from suborning the judicial 
process.  Judges, although enjoying independence-producing privileges, 
are in the end politically appointed and subject to the political exigencies 
of the day. 
Juries have themselves a dark underbelly revealed most starkly in 
Sullivan.137  They have a capacity to obstruct social change—in that 
case, the civil rights movement in the South.138  The jury reflects the 
 
 132. See, e.g., Brooke A. Masters, Culling a Shrunken Jury Pool: Some Go to 
Lengths to Avoid Service; Others Seek Limelight, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2004, at E1 
(discussing the trend of juror misconduct in current high-profile criminal cases and other 
systemic problems with the jury as an institution). 
 133. See generally Vischer, supra note 130. 
 134. Id. at 1. 
 135. Id. at 1–2. 
 136. For a thorough account on the purpose and development of the modern jury, 
see generally THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200–1800 (1985). 
 137. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 138. Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring). 
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society from which its members are drawn—its high values and its 
low.139  The Supreme Court in Sullivan found that free expression, 
necessary to sustain the promotion of the rights of minorities, could not 
be left to the community values of the jury.140  Constitutional prescription 
giving the judges the power to describe the dominion of free speech 
were essential.141  Whether the Court made the right choice may be 
debated,142 but the train long ago left the station.  For punitive damages, 
the same process is afoot. 
This Article cannot begin to analyze the problems besetting the 
institution of the jury.  But its fate is linked with the perceived ill health 
of punitive damages.143 
VII.  THE JURY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The image of the jury as an out of control institution is widely 
accepted and has fueled the Supreme Court’s intervention.144  Its flawed 
decisionmaking has also been grounds for legislative reform 
prescriptions.145  It is well established that juries rarely award punitive 
damages.146  They award punitives mainly for intentional misconduct, 
 
 139. See, e.g., Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and American 
Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 51–53 (2003) 
(inferring the racial and socio-economic composition of juries from county data, the 
authors find a positive correlation between high proverty rates among minorities and the 
quantum of damage awards). 
 140. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277–80. 
 141. Id. at 283. 
 142. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782 (1986). 
 143. See generally PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 51 (describing the conceptual 
failures of punitive damage jurisprudence and connecting the concept to the institution of 
the jury). 
 144. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1991) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 145. See Sharkey, Societal Damages, supra note 53, at 414–22 (discussing the 
realization of the societal damages). 
 146. See, e.g., Thomas A. Eaton et al., Another Brick in the Wall: An Empirical 
Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1056 (2000); 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL. STUD. 
623, 623–24 (1997); Neil Vidmar & Mary R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries in 
Florida: In Terrorem and in Reality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 487–88 (2001); see also 
Carol J. DeFrances & Marika F.X. Litras, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large 
Counties, 1996, 1999 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 9 
(“The median punitive damage amount awarded to plaintiff winners was $40,000.  
Twenty-one percent of punitive damage awards were over $250,000, and 7% were $1 
million or more . . . .”); Thomas H. Cohen & Steven K. Smith, Civil Trial Cases and 
Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, 2004 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS BULLETIN 6 (“Punitive damages were awarded in 6% of the 6,487 trial cases 
in which the plaintiff won damages.”). 
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and their quantum is firmly related to the compensatory damages.147  
Judges and juries do not vary with any statistical significance in their 
predilection to award punitive damages.148  The debate for those accepting 
empirical conclusions devolves to the level that some awards remain 
outrageous, and that they may overdeter potential defendants in decisions, 
usually corporate decisions relating to safety.149 
In addition, the unpredictability and variability of juries is marked.150  
The outbreaks of untoward punitive damages tend to be isolated to 
certain hot spots around the country.151  It must be said that those avid 
for strong legislative intervention do not go quietly into subtle law 
reform; the battle cry of outrageous punitive damages awards is seen as 
important fuel in large scale legislative interventions with the operation 
of tort law and with juries’ traditional freedom.152  Reform efforts 
focusing on caps and award limitations have often been blind to 
empirical research.153  They have failed to properly focus on identifying 
problematical aspects of decisionmaking as possible steps to cure 
flaws.154 
VIII.  JURY IMPROVEMENT 
The Supreme Court has decided that reprehensibility should be the 
lodestar.  Empirical research has shown that juries are better in 
 
 147. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An 
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 745 (2002).  But see Hersch & Viscusi, supra 
note 118, at 1 (arguing that jury awards are highly unpredictable and not significantly 
correlated with compensatory damages). 
 148. Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 750–51. 
 149. See, e.g., Reid Hastie, Putting it all Together, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra 
note 51, at 211, 232–33 (discussing the jury’s role in forcing corporations to deter against 
injuries where it is economically inefficient to do so); id. at 239–41 (noting that awards 
for punitive damages are disproportionately high when the facts of a case are 
considered).  Some, it should be noted, insist that the level of punitive damages has 
systemically mushroomed to impossible, unsustainable levels.  See Victor E. Schwartz et 
al., I’ll Take That: Legal and Public Policy Problems Raised by Statutes that Require 
Punitive Damages Awards to be Shared with the State, 68 MO. L. REV. 525, 557 (2003). 
 150. Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage, Erratic Awards, in PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES, supra note 51, at 31. 
 151. Partlett, supra note 19, at 817–23; see also George L. Priest, Punitive Damages 
Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 LA. L. REV. 825 (1996) (examining the incidence of 
punitive damages in Alabama). 
 152. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical 
Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 106–07 (2002). 
 153. Id. at 108. 
 154. Id. 
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determining retribution than in effecting deterrence.155  Juries should be 
given instructions that may be operationalized, and, most importantly, 
should be given comparative data on punitive damages awards.156  The 
greatest variance is perceived when juries have no numerical anchor for 
an award.157  Given random numerical anchors, moreover, awards will 
cluster around them, leading to arbitrary results.158  Where punitive awards 
are designed to punish in modern complex societies, they must be 
broadly notorious, give reasonable guidance to actors, and be consistent 
across like cases.159 
It will also be necessary to keep in mind the dynamics in which juries 
make decisions.  The juries are subject to the vicissitudes of group 
decisionmaking in the context of an adversarial proceeding.160  Measures 
to instruct juries, with an eye to informing them of their role and 
function, would be salutary.  However, Cass Sunstein and others argue 
that instructions will not cure the inherent cognitive dissonance of group 
decisionmaking by a jury.161  They are subject to “hindsight bias” that 
may tend to ready conclusions of wrongful intentional conduct.162  They 
are subject to “severity shift,” leading to larger awards by a jury than the 
individual jury members would themselves have awarded.163  This fact is 
part of the phenomena of group polarization that, because of the rhetoric 
of liability, drives awards to the upper side of the pole.164  An 
understanding of cognitive dimensions may encourage the disclosure of 
reasonable anchors drawn from comparative cases, a confining of 
passion through judicial controls, and refined instructions leading to an 
improved understanding of the purpose of the award.  It may also be 
advisable to provide instruction on appropriate ways juries should 
 
 155. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 147, at 771–75 (discussing the relationship 
between punitive and compensatory damages).  Sunstein concluded that this favors 
exclusion of the jury.  See Cass R. Sunstein, What Should Be Done?, in PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES, supra note 51, at 242.  This is not the case.  See Sharkey, Should Juries 
Decide?, supra note 51, at 411–12 (rejecting the conclusions offered by PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES, supra note 51). 
 156. Robbennolt, supra note 152, at 197–98. 
 157. Eisenberg et al., supra note 147, at 779. 
 158. Id. 
 159. This is a criticism that could be leveled at common law damages generally and 
has led to reform suggestions to make damages more consistent. 
 160. See, e.g., David A. Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity 
Shift, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 51, at 43, 57–61. 
 161. W. Kip Viscusi, Deterrence Instructions: What Jurors Won’t Do, in PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES, supra note 51, at 142, 162–64. 
 162. Reid Hastie et al., Looking Backward in Punitive Judgments: 20-20 Vision?, in 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 51, at 96, 106–08. 
 163. Schkade et al., supra note 160, at 57–61. 
 164. See Sharkey, Should Juries Decide?, supra note 51, at 388; see also Feigenson, 
supra note 125, at 259. 
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proceed to their decisions by avoiding pitfalls in group decisionmaking. 
Lastly, outrageous outliers in punitive damages tend to spring from 
isolated counties in various states.165  This indicates a malaise in those 
counties.166  The context of sympathetic plaintiffs injured by large out-
of-state defendants sets up a tension that may lead to inflation of 
awards.167  Juries are filled with less than a cross-section of the community.  
If the jury comprises those who are unable to avoid jury duty, the mix of 
opinion is unlikely to produce the most rational or restrained jury award.  
The movement to make jury service more attractive by removing 
impediments to devoting the time and paying jurors a fair sum for time 
lost on the job ought to be taken seriously.  Although it has been promoted 
by prodefendant groups, the initiative should have bipartisan support.168  
It is plain that the problem with punitives is not systemic.  Punitive 
damages are a part of well-grounded Anglo-American jurisprudence that 
ought to be reinforced by an appreciation that they undergird a 
republican ideal maximizing citizens’ dominion.  Our efforts ought to be 
directed at strengthening this formative institution, rather than performing 
radical surgery that many reformers favor. 
The efforts of the courts ought to be directed to making jury awards 
more principled and predictable.  Jurors lack the knowledge of comparative 
awards.  Judges, as repeat players, may exercise the corrective function 
by outlying verdicts in accord with the equity notion that like cases 
should be treated alike.  Even if jurors are given more appropriate anchors 
for their awards, verdicts may be out of balance.  Judges, then, in 
motions for remitter and on appeal, may act as an appropriate corrective.  
The robustness of the jury in asserting community outrage about the 
flouting of a right is not a symptom of the illness of the system.  Even 
the outrageous punitive award establishes a healthy dialogue where the 
wronged citizen is accorded respect and the wrongdoer suffers 
punishment for his or her misdeeds.  In the ebb and flow and in the 
 
 165. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS 
OF REFORM 240–43 (1995). 
 166. Partlett, supra note 19, at 822–23. 
 167. Id. at 822. 
 168. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., The Jury Patriotism Act: Making Jury Service 
More Appealing and Rewarding to Citizens, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL (2003) 
available at http://www.alec.org/meswfiles/pdf/0309.pdf (noting that the express steps 
are flexibility on scheduling, reduction of length of service, protection of employment 
rights, adequate compensation, repealing of unnecessary exemptions, increasing penalty 
for no-shows, and limiting excuses). 
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Supreme Court’s occasional forays, a republican perceives strength 
rather than failure. 
 
 
